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1| Introduction 
The realm of cosmopolitics and international relations, like the realms of right and 
ethics, is viewed by the liberal tradition as a domain of rational law.  Kant’s aspiration 
for cosmopolitics was a sphere in which international law, consistent with the dictates 
of reason, would express the will of every rational being unbiased by geographical 
and local contingencies and moral irrelevancies.
1
  This Enlightenment project, in so 
many ways bound to the political device of the social contract, still looms large over 
any attempt to understand and construct institutions and procedures for those issues 
which affect individuals as individuals yet require transnational cooperation and 
enforcement. 
Laws, according to Kant, should be universal, reciprocal and public.  These three 
formal requirements of political right act as constraints on the content of laws, that is 
those that cannot be accepted by individuals as their own laws are those which do not 
express the subject’s own right to self-determination.  Coercive political power is only 
legitimate if it appeals to reasons that any individual member of the state would freely 
endorse.  Publicity, that is the requirement that laws be codified in such a way that all 
citizens, if inclined, will be able to comprehend and endorse them, is, here, the most 
significant: in order for a law to motivate me, I must be able to act upon its ground as 
though it were my own motivation.  In that way, I remain free.  Kant’s avowal of 
rational autonomy sets the stage for the legitimation of political power in the liberal 
tradition, culminating in Rawls’s own principle of legitimacy: 
Our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe 
that the reasons we would offer for our political actions – were we to 
Comment [R1]: Put in reference to 
Kant’s works in the Political Writings 
volume here. 
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state them as government officials – are sufficient, and we also 
reasonably think that other citizens might also reasonably accept those 
reasons.
2
 
Publicity establishes, expresses and protects individual autonomy since a legitimate 
law is grounded in reasons that an individual would, if he or she were to deliberate 
impartially, acknowledge as his or her own.  Put simply, I am not coerced by the state 
into wearing a seatbelt as, if I were to reflect, I would freely constrain myself given 
the rational ground of the dictate.  A law is a rational shortcut, a reminder or a prompt, 
but (ideally) not an imposition. 
The putative assumption of contemporary political thought is that the above liberal 
account of legitimacy entails a universal rights-based and state-to-state model of 
international relations.  However, it may well be that this very presupposition is an 
orthodox dogma which obstructs a more appropriate and uncorrupted cosmopolitan 
approach to specific global issues.  The reason why liberal rights-based approaches 
are prevalent would seem to be quite straightforward: publicity demands that one 
must evaluate the legitimacy of obligations and laws and the liberal position seems to 
be the only political theory that can offer a justification of these evaluations.  Liberal 
accounts of rational legitimation of law are superior to embedded or contextual ones 
in that they allow a radical critique of existing laws and institutions from a universal 
point of view.  Embedded or culturally sensitive accounts of rational legitimation are 
ill-placed to evaluate other cultures because of their affinity to relativism and political 
legitimacy seems to amount to positive law; one is obliged to obey in virtue of being a 
member of a certain community.  At the international level this problem is 
compounded since only universal values will be effective to motivate the obedience of 
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all the individuals affected.  It is widely assumed that embedded values are inadequate 
for international dialogue and so, on the global level, liberal values best approximate 
those values that are most widely acceptable and universal; universal rights are 
supposed to protect that which is valuable to all human beings: liberty, welfare, 
opportunity, et al.  
The opposition between universal values and embedded values can, perhaps, best be 
illustrated by an example.  In the first few weeks of March 2001 officials from the 
Taliban’s Ministry for the Prevention of Vice and the Promotion of Virtue 
successfully fulfilled the task of destroying two giant statues of the Buddha in 
Bamiyan, 90 miles west of Kabul in Afghanistan.  These idols dated from the second 
and third centuries of the Common Era.  A sense of horror and disbelief swept the 
world, not only in the West and not only Buddhist countries; horror and disbelief that 
turned inevitably to anger and the demand for justification.  Justification had, 
however, already been given before the act was carried out.  In the reported words of 
Mullah Mohammad Omar we were told: “Because God is one God and these statues 
are there to be worshipped and that is wrong.  They should be destroyed so that they 
are not worshipped now or in the future.”3  But Omar’s words only appeal to a 
specific tradition and a limited group of individuals who share certain values and 
beliefs embedded in that tradition.  The liberal principle of legitimacy requires laws 
that are based on values and principles which, it is supposed, all men share no matter 
what their background, tradition or culturally contingent beliefs.  This requirement 
will generally entail that all contingent factors – such as culture, identity and tradition 
– will have to be bracketed off; that is, pushed to one side.  One looks at the question 
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not from the point of me as personal identity, but from the view with which all 
rational beings can agree no matter what their origins.
4
 
Does the aspiration to universality resolve the problem?  On the one hand, the reason 
is offered that the destruction of false idols is in accordance with God’s will.5  It 
would seem that Mullah Omar has already committed himself to a relative argument, 
in the sense that he expects his listener to embrace the fundamental presuppositions of 
his way of life, that is orthodox Islam.  Surely, if one can find a universal, secular 
argument for the preservation of the statues, Omar’s prescription will be trumped and 
negated.  There was almost universal horror at the wanton destruction of these idols, 
so one would assume that there are universal principles available.  One might claim 
“respect” or “tolerance”, but Omar may well demand the same for Islam: respect for 
Islam requires understanding of his actions and tolerance for Islam to carry out the 
dictates of its religion.  Conversely one may claim that the statues are significant for 
“humanity’s heritage” but such a vacuous appeal, even if a follower of Omar may 
agree to it, weighs ill against the requirements of divine law.  It seems that universal 
principles do not help (or – worse – are just not available) for this particular problem.  
Any appeal to the basic needs and rights required by liberty, equality or welfare is 
similarly unhelpful. 
Liberalism’s dogmatic assumption of universality relies on a coincidence between, 
firstly, the rights generated by universalism and the goods of the individual, an 
assumption which may be made at the national but not necessarily at the international 
level, and, secondly, that not only do all humans want liberty, security, welfare and 
equality but they also agree on the substantive content and hierarchy of these goods.  
These assumptions are often hidden at the local or national level since conflict does 
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not normally lead to a revision of basic moral values.  The example of the Bamiyan 
idols, however, illustrates the hollowness of such assumptions in global political 
conflict.  In national political debate, when one invokes values such as “respect” and 
“tolerance”, they are supported by a history of meanings that the participants in the 
dialogue share.  Such values appear universal because their intuitive nature 
unreflectively appeals to the members of such a tradition and such members share a 
substantive interpretation of what these values require.  Yet, in inter-cultural conflicts 
such as the Bamiyan idols, it is clear to see how such substantive interpretations differ 
even if formal values seemingly coincide.  The two implicit assumptions of liberalism 
are supported in national political debate by ethical homogeneity between individual 
and shared values, embodied in political structures and institutions; a shared moral 
homogeneity which is absent at the international level.  The liberal sleight of hand is 
harder to conceal in the global arena and yet it still obstructs agreement and free 
thinking since it is assumed that if coincidence is absent, then other participants in the 
dialogue are irrational, unreasonable or, simply, in error. 
Prior to Kant, both the agenda and the failure of any liberal cosmopolitics had been 
set by Rousseau: he desired to construct the conditions in which freedom and equality 
were maximised in spite of rather in accordance with the wishes of the citizens 
themselves.
6
  Therein lay the origin of the greatest contradiction of modern liberalism 
and also the fulfilled Enlightenment dream of cosmopolitan moral and political 
standards: how does one ensure that a strong enough moral homogeneity exists in 
order to garner agreement on laws between peoples?  The answer may well be a 
communitarian one: through a shared tradition and history of social meaning and 
values.   Before Rawls’s own discovery of the tension between free institutions and 
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the burdens of reason and an optimistic hope in the formation of a “sense of justice”, 
Rousseau sought to impose and support the liberal values of liberty and equality 
through draconian institutions such as a moral censor and a civil religion.
7
  It is 
perhaps the case, contrary to liberalism’s universalism, that secular, liberal principles 
adhere in our society because of the coincidence between these and our shared moral 
fabric, not vice versa.  When raised to the international level, the moral fabric – that is 
those beliefs, concepts, values and norms which govern the subject’s practical 
reasoning and derive from his or her membership of a particular culture, history or 
tradition – which supports the rights based approach to law is no longer ubiquitous 
and one is left with the choice: either to abandon cosmopolitan politics or to find an 
alternative approach.  This chapter is a tentative attempt to offer an alternative 
approach. 
2| The misrepresentation at the heart of liberalism 
The criticism that liberalism is at heart disingenuous is now well-known and 
established, centring upon the conception of an abstract personality which engages in 
deliberation.
8
  Liberalism itself is charged with being a conception of the good and not 
an impartial, universal point of view as it implicitly embodies certain social goods in 
its accounts of rationality and moral value which are unintelligible or undesirable 
outwith a specific culture.  Social goods, critics of liberalism hold, are constitutive of 
the identity of the person and are dependent upon a tradition or community for their 
meaning.  The abstraction from them in order to posit a universal account of 
personality is incoherent and leads to subjectivism: the idea that values are akin to 
mere preferences and tastes.  This means that a dialogue, if one accepts the liberal 
worldview, is not between rational values and principles, but between tastes and 
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preferences and the procedure of resolution will not be rational but due to the intensity 
(power) of one’s preferences.  At the local level, the problem goes unnoticed because 
there is a general ethical homogeneity between individuals and a minimal rationality 
is possible due to a shared moral fabric (we as a group share the meaning of 
“tolerance” or “respect” and can use it both formally and substantively in dialogue); 
but, at the global level, the state of war between nations for liberals remains and must 
remain a case of might is right.
9
  The communitarian challenge raised to the global 
level has a weak and a strong form: weakly, liberalism either contributes to a 
misunderstanding of the interests and values of other cultures by assuming that all 
human beings are alike in certain significant respects; or strongly it is a type of 
cultural imperialism that seeks to impose its own values on other cultures, minorities 
or individuals.  Either the weak form or the strong form is damaging for liberal 
cosmopolitanism since, at the international level, such a misrepresentation of the 
participant in dialogue is amplified into an abstraction of an abstraction and 
agreement between nations is either impossible or improbable since the moral fabric 
required to give substantive content to the abstract rights and wants of “universal 
man” is absent.   
Liberalism has always understood the goal of politics, whether at the national or 
international level, to be the organisation and mediation of conflicting interests 
between atomistic individuals.  This contract model of compromise between wills was 
extrapolated from the individual-to-individual level to the state-to-state level, using 
the idea of a state will, or a homogenous idea of a people or society.  Such a contract 
requires that an agreement be made which is fair and just, that is, is not affected by 
partisan interests or contingent facts; so agreements must be made as the result of 
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dialogues between abstract personalities and not actual personalities.  If one adopts a 
rights-based contractual model of cosmopolitanism, then it will badly corrupt actual 
dialogues on matters such as the environment, trade and arms through a 
misrepresentation of personal or particular preferences and values, making legitimate 
agreement impossible. 
3| Liberalism and the social contract 
As Hobbes inaugurated the liberal project, he defined politics as the science of “men 
in multitudes” and political power was justified to minimise conflicting interests 
between individuals in a fixed territory.  For Hobbes, the only motivation capable of 
securing political obligation was the universal, substantive desire for self-
preservation.
10
  The problem for later liberals was that, in truth, Hobbes spoke of self-
interest and justified the existence of political institutions and laws only as a modus 
vivendi which could be destabilised by a single individual.  Kant departs from this 
Hobbesian picture only insofar as laws ought to be based on reason rather than exist 
as a mere contingent modus vivendi derived from basic needs and desires.  The 
rationalist departure from naturalism demanded that the motivation to obey law 
should not be grounded in universal, substantive desires but in a moral obligation: the 
formal requirements of right demand that a law or institution is justified if it is 
acceptable to individuals’ reason.   
However, what was gained in stability, was lost in terms of motivation.  The 
hypothetical nature of the contract was transposed from human nature to universal 
rationality; from “if you want x, then you ought to y (and all human beings want x)” 
to “if you are rational, then you ought to y (and all human beings are rational).”  Thus, 
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the agenda of liberal politics was fulfilled: only those laws which would be acceptable 
to the free and rational individual were legitimate and could be sanctioned by the 
state.  The meaning of “publicity” is that coercive political power is legitimate if it 
makes appeal to reasons that the individual would freely endorse in an ideal 
deliberating position: “All actions affecting the rights of other human beings are 
wrong if their maxim is not compatible with their being made public.”11 
However, it is this very contractarian tradition which frustrates the political 
achievements of the cosmopolitan viewpoint.  Kant’s mistake – and consequentially 
that error which resides at the heart of most liberal transnational politics – was to raise 
the same demands of rationality into the international sphere.
12
   The social contract 
model – the conjectural metaphor which Kant inherits from Rousseau – casts nations 
as persons and demands they act according to the rational will which represents the 
will of their citizens.
13
  International agreements must meet the same demands as 
contracts reached at the national level: reciprocity, publicity and universality.   
Kant’s publicity grounds the notion of law and cosmopolitan law is not exempt from 
this.  What distinguishes cosmopolitan law is its subsidiarity or the level at which a 
conflict must be resolved.  Conflicts between individuals have their appropriate level 
of appeal: an argument between siblings should be resolved within the family, an 
argument about the use of land within the local community, educational policy at the 
national level and trade restrictions at the international level.
14
  Some problems are 
well-suited to a contractual model of international relations, mostly those of trade, 
when there exists a recognisably national will which a sovereign government can 
represent (all citizens would desire economic stability and growth, all things being 
equal, if they reasoned impartially).  The problem arises concerning issues which are 
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not reflected in any person of the nation.  Some problems (poverty, environment, the 
rights of a specific, minority culture) cannot be dealt with by nation state politics and 
so necessitate a cosmopolitan viewpoint, that is the viewpoint of communities with 
shared interests that are transnational.  Within a state, there may exist no homogenous 
opinion about the environment or arms since these are not subjects which are divided 
by national identity; what is good for one citizen may not be good for another  (the 
industrialist sees environmentally inspired sanctions as punitive, the resident on the 
coast of East Anglia sees them as necessary).  Poverty, the  environment, the arms’ 
trade transcend a strict state to state multilateralism and necessitate a transnational, 
hypercommunal standpoint that will often divide the citizens of nations into different 
interest groups incapable of representation in the unified person of the state.  
Cosmopolitics, as a model of international relations different from the standard state-
to-state model, possesses the advantages of separating the individual’s voice from the 
national voice, undermining non-democratic governments where there is not even the 
weakest link between individuals and their representative on the international stage 
and also representing voices from smaller countries or minorities that are drowned out 
in the cacophony of shrill, international dialogues. 
However, the metaphor of the social contract model which views nations as persons 
continues to obstruct and corrupt the dialogue at the heart of cosmopolitics.  It forces 
individuals to recognise themselves in a national will which is not representative of 
their own values and preferences.  The social contract model rests upon a false 
analogy: the same procedures involved in intra-state justification are applied to inter-
state justification and nations are cast as persons with a unified will in order to agree 
on laws, conventions and resolutions to conflicts in the role of contracting parties, as 
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though they existed in a Hobbesian state of war.  This process rests on a fundamental 
error of analogy that assumes the nation corresponds to a person but, as has already 
been mentioned, cosmopolitan issues are those in which the national will is not a 
unified will.  At the state level, one deals with an abstraction of my personality to 
generate the agreement (the ideal deliberating position): those factors which are 
morally irrelevant are dissected from what is “essential” to rational agreement.  
However, at the international level, one deals with an abstraction of an abstraction.  
The question becomes who the person of the nation actually represents.  
Cosmopolitics will represent “community interests”, but for any international law 
derived from these interests to be legitimate, it must be public and universal.  Whereas 
an individual within a given state can recognise what is morally relevant in the 
abstraction of his personality for the purpose of agreement with fellow citizens, such 
recognition at the international level, when one’s will is represented by an abstraction 
of the government, disappears.  The ideological mistake of traditional international 
politics is the universalisation of social atomism on to a higher level and it attempts to 
silence the worry that modern states do not properly represent the unified interests of 
a people. 
The contract model of international relations incorporates two anomalies: first, it 
relies on a coincidence between the political and ethical cultures which is 
characteristic of a particular ideal of the nation.  So, for Western states, the ideas of 
formal rights are reflected in democratic institutions and policies that embody 
substantive values familiar and acceptable to us all.  In other words, there is an 
alignment between universal rights dictated by reason - rights all men would accept if 
they were to abstract themselves from the contingencies of their situation - and 
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substantive moral evaluations of the Western mind.  Our ethical identities ensure 
political homogeneity, our national identity generates agreement.  And, secondly, it 
assumes that a nation can adequately represent the unified will of a people on all 
issues.   
4| The dialectic of rational legitimation 
Cosmopolitics, in an attempt to respond to these anomalies, divides itself into two 
main strategies: the universalist and the particularist.
15
  The first seeks universal 
consensus in desires or values that all human beings share.  The advantages of such an 
approach are that it is inclusive as well as being non-perspectival.  The disadvantages 
are, of course, the non-existence or formalism of universal values or desires and the 
denial of difference to the point of exclusion.  The communitarian critiques of 
liberalism repeatedly assert that formal right is empty and unable to supply positive 
obligations unless accompanied by a substantive account of the good, or at least a 
guide to how to interpret the universal rights of liberty, equality, respect and dignity.
16
  
All agents may agree the world over that respecting one’s dead is a social practice 
which ought to be tolerated and maintained, yet the obligations that such a practice 
involves may well be abhorrent to a specific culture: 
Darius, after he had got the kingdom, called into his presence certain 
Greeks who were at hand, and asked – ‘What he should pay them to eat 
the bodies of their fathers when they died?’  To which they answered, 
that there was no sum that would tempt them to do such a thing.  He then 
sent for certain Indians, of the race called Callatians, men who eat their 
fathers, and asked them, while the Greeks stood by, and knew by the 
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help of an interpreter all that was said – ‘What he should given them to 
burn the bodies of their fathers at their decease?’ The Indians exclaimed 
aloud, and bade him forbear such language.
17
   
If at the national level where a shared tradition exists or a dominant one defines the 
moral fabric which is to serve as a standard and a hierarchy of conceptions of the 
good, pluralism threatens the universal application of rights, then the problem at the 
international level can only be amplified, where there is no single, homogeneous or 
historically dominant conception of the good which determines values, positive 
obligations and substantive norms. 
In contrast to this universalism, a second, particularist strategy identifies particular 
communities as persons with their own specific values, hence it proposes values 
which will motivate and be substantively efficacious in practical reasoning.  But, this 
celebration of difference and openness to other ways of life is bought at the cost of 
comprehension and agreement:  
According to all reports, it was Cortés himself, perhaps yielding to a 
subconscious impulse to justify his own deeds, who first attempted to 
convert Moctezuma. The emperor politely heard out the Spaniard’s 
harangue. When the great conquistador invidiously compared the pure 
and simple rite of the Catholic Mass with the hideous Aztec practice of 
human sacrifice, however, Moctezuma put in a word. It was much less 
revolting to him, he explained, to sacrifice human beings than it was to 
eat the flesh and blood of God himself. We do not know whether Cortés 
was quite able to counter this dialectic.
18
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Rational values dissolve into particular relative expressions of interests and 
worldviews incapable of convergence. 
For a cosmopolitics to be adequate to its task, it must be articulated in terms of values 
which are intelligible and recognised by each community involved in the dialogue.  In 
other words, these values must be universal without being empty, substantive without 
being local.  One way values can meet this requirement is by respecting the difference 
between traditions and communities, but these values cannot be purely local or 
intelligible only to the specific few because reason cannot be a free and arbitrary play 
of concepts: one’s values and political judgements must be structured and intelligible.  
That is to say, those values and statements which are to play the role of legitimation 
must not just be intelligible to all, but must be possible motivations for all.  Reason 
alone is stuck between the dialectical poles of the need to respect difference on the 
one hand and the need to make universal judgements on the other.  In legitimating 
international law, a reliance on universal goods or rights leads to either empty 
agreement or simple non-agreement; whereas, a reliance on substantive conceptions 
of the good leads to relativism and non-agreement.  Unless a universal account of 
human nature or interests can be found, then one either retreats back to formal right or 
abandons any hope of a cosmopolitan politics. 
The practical problem with rationalist approaches is an overburdening of reason 
which either results in vacuous agreement or pure and simple non-agreement.  The 
appeal to the faculty of reason is one-sided unless one also makes an appeal to the 
faculty of imagination: nations, even where they can be clearly defined and 
designated, are complex, multifaceted and plural communities, ruled in part by reason 
but also the values dictated by history, tradition and contingency.  The reliance on 
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reason alone negates this fact, abstracts from what is real and makes any agreement 
alien and incoherent to the very agents it affects.  If it respects this fact, reason makes 
agreement impossible.  It, therefore and in both cases, violates the condition of 
publicity so central to the notion of a legitimate law.  There is a very real need to 
appeal to actual communities with actual interests, not abstract political entities with 
supposedly unified interests, in order to generate true agreement.  The hermeneutical 
requirement that an explanation be meaningful rather than causal – that is, a condition 
that the particular agent represents what the legislator determines him to do as 
something he himself would want – is another way of understanding the requirement 
of publicity.  Without the faculty of the imagination this is impossible. 
5| The faculty of the imagination 
If reason is the sole faculty which governs practical wisdom, then one finds oneself 
caught in a dialectic.  On the one hand, if the prescriptions of reason are universal, 
then normative terms such as “respect” are formal and empty in that participants in a 
discourse can agree that respect is a good, but not what such a good should 
substantively entail, whether it be respecting one’s dead or treating men as equal.  On 
the other hand, if one starts from the particular prescription of reason, then agreement 
is at best improbable and, at worst, impossible.  For me, homage to one’s gods is paid 
by sacrificing willing victims, for you it is in metaphorically consuming His body, but 
one (or both) of us is just wrong.  To say one ought to tolerate a repulsive practice 
because it can be understood in terms commensurable to both practices is to make the 
terms unintelligible to the participants in the discourse.  One will be unable to use 
prescriptions – because they are to be generated bottom up – to criticise those 
practices in other communities that one feels, intuitively and reasonably, to be wrong: 
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the destruction of ancient statues, human sacrifice, cannibalism and also others not 
discussed here: female circumcision, slavery and child exploitation, for example. 
Resolution may well be impossible since such an approach to the understanding of 
foreign cultures and cosmopolitan prescriptivism is dominated by the Kantian 
tradition and the faculty of reason. To put it more simply, it seems to ignore – and 
here it is in no way unique in philosophy – an alternative faculty or way of knowing, 
that is the imagination.  One could invoke a separate, hermeneutical tradition which 
represents this way of knowing and its centrality to the human and social sciences 
which would contain names beginning from the Italian humanists, Vico, Herder, 
Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer, Berlin, Hampshire and Walzer which would represent 
this way of knowing and its centrality to the human and social sciences.
19
  
Imagination in its most basic form asks “what if things were not as they are, if they 
were different” and “what if I were you”.  Such imagination begins with the conflict 
of values and does not seek to overcome it in terms applicable to each agent.  Instead 
it is the attempt on the part of a political agent to truly comprehend the force and 
meaning of an alien obligation.  The imagination is the negation of necessary 
prescriptions of reason, the opening up of possibilities and this is the first step of both 
understanding and critique.  Imagination begins with substantive values, not formal 
requirements. 
Beginning from the particular instance of conflict and of injustice and not from the 
prescriptions of reason, however, seems to encourage relativism and particularism, yet 
such a claim depends on whether one begins from reason in the particular, or from 
imagination; that is, a form of knowing as a way of understanding, of interpreting the 
different moral fabric of an alien community and coming to see it from inside.  To 
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begin from reason is to stay trapped in reason; imagination opens dialogue up whereas 
reason closes it off.  Imagination allows the political agent to enter the mind of the 
other participant in the discourse, to overcome the axiom of practical reason which 
obstructed Cortés and Moctezuma from understanding the true meaning of each 
other’s ritual.  To reveal and interrogate one’s own implicit standards of reasoning 
often requires this step outside oneself into difference rather than into the abstract 
personality of liberalism, so the aim is twofold: to understand the other and oneself 
better through the faculty of the imagination.  Only when true comprehension is 
achieved, only when political agents have overcome those prejudices and ideologies 
which haunt their view of the world, can reasoning begin.  The resolution of conflicts 
of values and the construction of prescriptions with universal appeal are as concerned 
with the imagination as they are with reason.  The Kantian approach demands 
publicity, reciprocity and universalism, but reason alone creates a tension between the 
first and last conditions.  The imagination is an attempt to ensure the harmony of all 
three. 
Cosmopolitics understood in this way affirms itself as a fundamental commitment to 
the interests of humanity: each person is a citizen of the world and this affords him or 
her respect due to this status.  The faculties of imagination and reason in tandem will 
allow agents to formulate prescriptions and laws which take account of this humanism 
and, therefore, meet the requirement of publicity.  The imagination, though, faces the 
problem of normativity: can one say “you ought to imagine thus and so” in the same 
way that one can say “you ought to reason thus and so”?  In order for an alternative 
cosmopolitanism which takes seriously the role of the imagination to be possible, one 
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has to show that the imagination can impose normative constraints on its own 
production.     
6| Vico and the new science 
The nature of the constraints the imagination imposes on its own production should 
not be confused with universal ethical norms.  If one were to do so, one would fall 
into the trap of rationalism and be guilty of imposing ethical norms on a discourse 
which is exempt from such considerations: a sane man can write American Psycho or 
film the Texas Chain Saw Massacre and we can imaginatively participate in reading 
or viewing such works.  When one writes a horror, a science fiction or a detective 
novel, there are structural prescriptions dictated by the genre and these act as 
constraints on the possible production of imaginative objects.
20
  Similarly, and more 
banally, when one imagines where one wants to go on holiday, there are constraints to 
the spontaneous formation of judgements concerning possible holidays.  So, the object 
of our judgement is pivotal in the constraints that apply to our production.  The mind 
can imagine any nature of cruelty or immorality and any number of oppressive, 
inhumane social structures, but the goal of the imagination in political 
cosmopolitanism is not to imagine a possible way of life, but more pertinently a way 
of life one would find intelligible and accept.  In order to constrain the political 
imagination, one ought to firstly recognise that it is aimed at a specific production: the 
production of possible political and social fabrics and their embedded reasons for 
action.  If one imagines a society and says, “No one in their right mind would want to 
live there”, then, regardless of its possibility to exist, it is not a legitimate society 
because it does not meet the rational requirement of publicity.  However, the faculty 
of reason alone cannot furnish us with prescriptions; neither can the faculty of 
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imagination alone.  Particularism demands imagination, universalism demands 
reason.  One ay forward is to bring together the two aspects of knowing in order to 
offer an answer to the question: would I accept these policies, institutions or laws if I 
were any and all of those agents affected by them?  The answer requires both the 
faculties of imagination and reason to work in tandem. 
Such a way of knowing, even if it reveals a different faculty at the base of one’s 
practical wisdom, seems to remain trapped in a particularism: I can fully comprehend 
why you – as a member of such and such a community – do φ, but when I step back 
into my own community with its norms, values of mode of reasoning, I find it wrong 
to do φ.  The problem with reason was that prescriptions aim at what is universal, 
whereas the imagination aims at what is particular, so – in a sense – it openly admits 
“each to his own”.  To ask what it would be like to be you, however, requires a 
foundation of commonality: I can – dependent on the development of the faculty of 
my imagination – imagine what it would be like to be a woman, to be a French 
revolutionary, to live in Neolithic times only if there is, at base, something significant 
(whether it be basic needs and desire or a way of structuring of experience, or 
something else) that I share with the objects of my imagination.  So, in the same vein, 
I perhaps cannot (so easily) imagine what it would be like a bat, a cat, a hat or a gas 
based life form living in Alpha Centauri.  The aim of an ethics of interpretation is to 
identify what is shared and significant: I may be short-sighted like a bat or share the 
name “Sam” with my cat, but these are inconsequential since it does not help me to 
imagine the bat’s or the cat’s world.21  The prescriptions and elements which govern 
possible objects of imagination and the formation of spontaneous judgements require 
an ethics of interpretation to meet the need to distinguish between legitimate social 
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orders and illegitimate ones; one needs to ask: can I imagine myself as a political 
agent bound by laws, values and social goods in this particular society?  To illustrate 
such an ethics of interpretation and to identify what the basis of the commonality 
between human beings might be, it is pertinent to return to a neglected figure in the 
history of philosophy, Vico.  
Vico’s criticism of natural law and social contract theory coincides neatly with 
comments made above about modern liberal assumptions concerning universal rights 
and goods. He also criticises the rationalist politics of Plato because this approach 
imposes philosophical ideas top-down on all civilisations, ignoring the reliance of 
one’s own civilised reason in the arbitrary and contingent primitive myths which form 
the origin of one’s “sophisticated” reason.  Such rational appeals to self-certainty can 
only be accepted by those who share the same history and tradition as oneself.
 22
    
The historicism implicit in his “new science” offers a hermeneutical account of 
historical understanding that opens the possibility of a political critique of established 
practices and institutions and also the possibility to understand alien cultures “from 
the inside”. 
Prior to the word “science” being appropriated by the natural and empirical sciences, 
its meaning was broader, a breadth still implicitly in play in most Latin languages: 
science was synonymous with the ways of knowing and these were plural, not merely 
the one sole method which we now nominate when we use the word.  Vico’s intention 
was to offer the proper method or mode of knowing for history understood as an 
anthropological and sociological description of human living.  History has no proper 
method and is littered with errors because men, when in a state of ignorance, have a 
tendency to judge what is different in terms of what is familiar; to domesticate the 
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alien.
23
  For Vico, the knowledge applicable to historical understanding is that which 
is generated by the imagination.  Perception is often erroneous, judgements are often 
immediate and unfounded and reasons offered to support these judgements are often 
defective.  The only certain items of knowledge for Vico are those which the human 
mind produces.
24
  The faculty which produces knowledge is ingenuity, the 
imagination, a faculty of the mind which invents in art, synthesises in geometry and 
perceives similarities between instances in arguments.
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With regard to the nature of society, Vico occupies an odd position: like Aristotle and 
Hegel, Vico does not think human beings can exist independently from a social order, 
but like Hobbes, Locke and the social contract tradition, he sees society as an artificial 
and not a natural entity.  To put it simply, society is a man-made object, but is 
necessary for a certain species of animal to become human through the re-channelling 
and redirection of desires and passions into the creation of a moral, socially adjusted 
being.  Society begins with an imaginative leap and the invention of a religion; the 
ideas, rituals and practices of which form the basis of social living and the substantive 
dictates of practical reason.  This initial imaginative leap creates the basic axioms 
(“credible impossibles”) of one’s practical reason and substantiates them in 
institutions, a conception of the good and a web of social values and meanings.  
Society is artificial, in the barest sense of being made by man, but its creation is not 
motivated by reason but emotion, first amongst all, fear.  Any ahistorical account of 
natural law is in error because there is no one law accessible to all rational beings 
equally throughout history.  Rather reason is dependent on contingent axioms derived 
form worldviews which are creatively born from the imagination and ingenuity of the 
first peoples and, most notably, their poets.  It is a “conceit of scholars” to think that 
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the laws of our day are adequate for earlier ages or that their own conceptions of law 
were either mistaken or inadequate approximations of our own. 
Historical science has hitherto failed because it has sought to impose our own 
concepts and values on to minds which thought and lived differently from ourselves 
and also assumed that the way in which we understand the world is adequate to 
understand a former way of life.  And, since history is necessary to sociology and 
political science, these two disciplines are also in error.  The appeal to moral 
intuitions or common sense is valid only within a specific tradition:  
Common sense is a judgement without reflection, shared by an 
entire class, an entire people, an entire nation, or the entire human 
race.
26
   
Common sense is the unreflective certainty of a human being based in his customs 
and traditions and, thus, common sense requires a shared tradition or history and not 
all humans share the same history.  However, as this quotation reveals, Vico admits 
that there is a form of common sense universal to all humans:  
Now since this world of nations has been made by man, let us see in 
what institutions all men agree and always have agreed.  For these 
institutions will be able to give us the universal and eternal 
principles (such as every science must have) on which all nations 
were founded and still preserve themselves.
27
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Although political and moral judgements are expressions of a culture, there are some 
in which all men will recognise themselves.  It is these ideas and obligations which 
will form the constraint on the imagination when utilised to imagine what possible 
social and political obligations can exist for the individual.  Ideas which are universal 
amongst all people must have a common ground and so relativism only concerns 
certain judgements, whereas universalisation consists in the fact that a deep language 
must be based in naturalism (needs all humans share).  These needs will be reflected 
in the universal institutions shared by all societies:  
This, and no other, is certainly the human nature which, at all times 
and in all places, has based its practices upon the following three 
common senses of mankind: first, that providence must exist; 
second, that men should beget certain children by certain women, 
with whom they must share at least the rudiments of a civil religion, 
in order that children be bought up by their fathers and mothers in a 
spiritual unity in conformity with the laws and religions amongst 
which they were born; third, that the dead should be buried.
28
 
Myths, metaphysics and languages reflect the institutions which gave birth to them 
(“The order of ideas must follow the order of institutions.”) and institutions reflect the 
“mental vocabulary” which is universal.29  Vico calls this a common mental language: 
human nature is a product of society, but for a group or tribe to be a society, it is 
necessary that they are bound by three necessary institutions: marriage, respect for the 
dead and religion.   
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Science must begin from “philology” or the laying bare (through hermeneutical 
analysis) of those assumptions implicit in the language, institutions, metaphysics and 
myths which ground and frame a way of life.  Such a science must begin from the 
faculty of the imagination or ingenuity and not rational argument. So, if one is to 
imagine what life would be like for a human at a specific historical time, then one 
must firstly recognise that in order to be a human he or she must be moulded by those 
primitive institutions necessary for social living, that is marriage, death and religion 
which reflect the natural conditions of human existence.  To imagine outside these is 
to imagine a being which is not human.  And to comprehend the particular nature of a 
culture, one must look at the actual form of its myths, institutions and language in 
order to understand its view of the world and the agent’s own understanding of his 
roles, duties and obligations.  This ethics of interpretation is an alternative to the top-
down approach of rationalism in that it appeals firstly to comprehension rather than 
substantive universal reasons. 
When employed in history, sociology or political science, the imagination will be 
constrained by the dual axis of philology and philosophy.  Philology is the 
hermeneutic interrogation of the myths, religion and self-understanding of a people.  
Philosophy is the rational endeavour to divide what are merely contingent 
manifestations of desires, wants and preferences from the expressions of necessary 
natural and social needs.  What counts as a possible reason for action depends upon 
the structural fabric of what is a possible human society and Vico’s investigation 
reveals that in order for a human to be a human as opposed to an animal, his mind 
must be formed and informed by the social and moral fabric constituted by a theology, 
a metaphysics, the concept of responsibility and the motivation of self-love.
30
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7| The philological-philosophical method as a way to formulate 
universal principles 
The commonality of humanity is, then, represented by three universal institutions: 
religion, marriage and respect for the dead.  These in turn represent that the fact that 
humans qua humans will have a basic web of beliefs about creation, purpose and the 
intelligibility of the universe (religion, science, metaphysics), they will have basic 
divisions of roles and rights and a interlaced hierarchy of obligations and duties 
(family and class structures), and also they will see death as, in some sense, 
intrinsically significant in the life of the community as a whole and to the individuals 
who constitute that community (rites of death, sanctity of human life, the intrinsic 
worth of human life, a system of rights, et cetera). 
Vico holds that the commonality of humanity is found in his social existence as 
constrained by a minimal naturalism and, so, he grounds his historical science in the 
faculty of imagination regulated by basic universal facts about human beings. It seems 
that, at base, the aspect of universality for political judgements is to be grounded in 
naturalism, but Hobbes’s project, which sought to unite ethics with self-regarding 
reason to generate political norms, reduced human beings to asocial, atomistic bundles 
of desires that are too simple to explain the multifaceted variety of social behaviour.  
For Vico, naturalism constrains the faculty of imagination which produces the 
foundations for substantive judgements of reason only indirectly.  Hobbesian rational 
naturalism is too restrictive since it begins and ends with reason alone: all men want 
welfare, that is the maximal satisfaction of desires.  However, this underdetermines 
the possible constitution of welfare and has the consequence of oversimplifying 
sociology by not supplying the necessary concepts for a full understanding of human 
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behaviour.  Humans often sacrifice their own felicity, and that of their families, for 
other social goods whether significant or trivial, and unless one can understand the 
nature of these sacrifices, sociology as a science remains incomplete.  The basic needs 
and desires of humans can be satisfied and manifested in a myriad ways depending on 
one’s worldview. 
Vico’s naturalism does not reduce human beings to bundles of desires, instead holding 
that the commonality of human nature is the necessary boundedness in structurally 
universal institutions required for human existence and although these institutions are 
themselves grounded in desires and needs, it is the meanings of the institutions and 
not the causal efficacy of desires which provide the content for obligations, duties and 
social roles.  The philological-philosophical method is indirectly grounded in a 
minimal naturalism because the faculty of imagination is constrained by these 
considerations in the production of possible social worlds.  A reflective attitude to 
one’s social practices and mores will disclose their contingent grounding in an 
imaginative creation of a possible way to exist humanly.  Such a minimal naturalism 
when applied to the issue of conflict demands that for a social fabric to fulfil its role, 
then it must embody the human commitments to the value of life, the significance of 
death, the goodness of security, the rightness of law, the badness of unnecessary pain, 
and so on.  And, more importantly, the violation, repression or contradiction of any of 
these requires justification which appeals to central values of the tradition, the 
grounding myth.  Any society which engages in violating practices is either 
illegitimate or needs to offer a “bloody good reason” for the violation.   
Of course, the burden of the argument rests heavily on that last comment.  It is 
sociologically true that religion, for most cultures, has a monopoly on the storehouse 
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of “bloody good reasons”: Moctezuma, for example, offered an eloquent rejection of 
the Catholic Mass in favour of a ritual of human sacrifice and Omar offered a more 
direct, yet coherent, reason for the destruction of the Bamiyan idols.  It is here that 
one must separate the sociological aspirations of the philological-philosophical 
method from its normative commitments.  As a method for sociology, hermeneutics 
has a definite role to play, but there is little reason to suppose it can provide normative 
constraints.  
Unless, that is, one is involved in conflict between ways of life and each “agent” in 
the discourse is committed to peaceful resolution.  Once one is disposed to dialogue 
rather than aggression, then certain levels of society are no longer allowed to the 
negotiating table.  Moctezuma’s civilisation is an example of the heroic stage of 
history: a society still bound to inegalitarianism and right is might.  The same could 
be said for fundamentalists as opposed to religious reformers.  To complete the 
picture of Vico’s science, one must posit an ethics of interpretation which determines 
those traditions which are reasonable or responsible and only these can enter into 
dialogue.  Such a move will supply the universal procedural norms of negotiation 
between substantive accounts of the good.  In modern secular societies the situation of 
pluralism has made it impossible to appeal to metaphysical, theological or 
comprehensive ethical beliefs in the legitimation of laws.  Such a secular society for 
Vico is characterised by the norm of equality; a norm characteristic of a mature, 
reflective tradition. 
One may well object that it is folly to assume that participants in the international 
arena are committed to peaceful resolution rather than expressions of latent force.  
Yet, such an objection misses a point central to cosmopolitanism.  Cosmopolitanism, 
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following the picture outlined here, is a commitment to seek a resolution without 
recourse to violence and is an implicit avowal of the maturity of a tradition.  The 
alternative is war.
31
  Vico delineates three social paradigms, the ages of “gods”, 
“heroes” and “men”, and it is only in the latter of these that agents are committed to 
democracy and discursive reason.
32
  Only those cultures which are examples of the 
“age of men” will be committed to cosmopolitanism since conflict resolution for the 
other ages would be violence and might (justified by divine right and natural power 
respectively) and there is no need to recognise others as humans with equal moral 
worth, but rather to consider them as barbarians, aliens, strangers and primitives. 
By beginning from the faculty of the imagination, normative constraints on what is or 
is not permissible in all cultures is possible.  The imagination can ask the question 
whether this practice, institution or policy can be made intelligible or whether the 
agent ought to demand “bloody good reasons” for obeying it which do not seem to be 
available.  In order to engage in reflection and conversation aimed towards peaceful 
resolution, one must belong to a mature, democratic tradition or, to use Vico’s term, 
to the “age of men”.  And, in such a tradition, the commitment to equality and 
understanding (reciprocity) seems to put in question the sincerity and validity of 
reasons which would justify such practices as the destruction of ancient statues, ritual 
sacrifice, cannibalism, female infibulation, child exploitation and slavery. 
8| The proper meaning of political liberalism 
One need not endorse Vico’s philosophy of history in its entirety, but it may well be 
an expression of something which has central importance for cosmopolitanism.  In the 
previous section equality as a norm is one which is adopted by “mature” or 
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“reasonable” traditions and such traditions are characterised by an awareness of the 
embedded and contextual nature of any seemingly self-evident and intuitive moral 
values.  What appears intuitively to be thus and so to one agent will not to an other 
from a different tradition.  For Vico, the sovereignty of reason needs to be humbled 
because the axioms it holds to be self-evident are refined expressions of an arbitrary 
and arational historical origin.  Such a thesis parallels the claim that one’s moral 
values are embedded in metaphysical and comprehensive visions and cannot be 
otherwise. 
The maturity or reasonableness of a tradition is constituted by the awareness of this 
finitude and the impossibility of universal, substantive justifications of a law.  
Therefore, the political agent is aware that he or she cannot but speak from a 
perspective and that this is also true of all participants in the dialogue; neither can 
claim default privilege.  The model of an abstract, individual in an ideal deliberating 
position is replaced by concrete participants engaged in an ideal dialogical position.  
Mature traditions, in consequence, must be those which are committed to respecting 
the finitude of others in order to bring about non-violent resolution and such respect 
translates into the norm of reciprocity: in the absence of other considerations, each 
perspective must have equal weight and a law which affects both participants cannot 
accord with one tradition and not the other.  The norm of reciprocity coupled with the 
faculty of imagination also ensures publicity, for respect demands that one truly 
comprehend the claims of the other.  Of course, that leaves but one—and perhaps the 
most important norm—to be justified, that is universality. 
What we saw in the introduction of this chapter was the way in which liberalism 
required a sympathetic and homogenous moral fabric in order to be practically 
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efficacious on the individual.  One problem we have encountered again and again is 
that though I may comprehend your reasons for action (philological), I see no reason 
for them to motivate me when my imaginative identification is over (philosophical).  
Such an attitude undermines agreement on policies.  However, implicit to this is the 
assumption, given the motivations of your way of life and of mine, since there exists 
no reason to prefer one or the other, I opt for what is familiar and more immediate.  
This is once more an error highlighted by Vico.  In order to make impartial practical 
judgements, Rorty assumes that obligations to others must be grounded in some sense 
of identification or a “one-of-us-ness”.33  On the national level, the state uses 
nationalism to foster such a sentiment.  On the level of international relations, this 
requires a commitment to a common humanity which serves to constrain the play of 
the imagination.  Imagination fosters fellow-feeling because it is a faculty which 
makes identification with others possible on the basis of what we have in common.  
Vico’s science posits as its ground a shared human nature which could form the basis 
of recognition on certain issues. 
Rorty sees the formation of community through dialogue as a way to resolve conflict, 
as a form of justice.  He again sees it as purely determined by reason, but already 
reason is broader and more in line with what has been described above:     
In this account of rationality, being rational and acquiring a larger 
loyalty are two descriptions of the same activity.  This is because any  
unforced agreement between individuals and groups about what to do 
creates a form of community, and will, with luck, be the initial stage in 
expanding the circles of those whom each party to the agreement had 
previously taken to be “people like ourselves”.  The opposition between 
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rational argument and fellow feeling thus begins to dissolve, for fellow 
feeling may, and often does, arise from the realization that the people 
whom one thought might have to go to war with, use force on, are, in 
Rawls’s sense “reasonable.”  They are, it turns out, enough like us to see 
the point of compromising differences in order to live in peace, and of 
abiding by the agreement that has been hammered out.  They are, to 
some degree at least, trustworthy.
34
 
One could perhaps be more optimistic: we can come to comprehend the values of the 
other and imagination will constrain our interpretation from partiality through the 
historical-hermeneutic axes.  Consensus requires both reason and imagination.  It 
relies on, firstly, understanding but also on offering “reasons” acceptable to all.  
Cosmopolitanism requires a sophisticated account not just of reason but also of the 
imagination, each constraining the other—not identification (we are the same) but 
recognition (I comprehend your difference and what we have in common).  We share 
the same motivations even if expressed differently and our interests coincide more 
closely than those of national identity; we form a person of “common interest”.  And 
since we share an interest, if we form an agreement, I am sure you will abide by it and 
we can enter into the dialogue as a concrete person with an interest. 
The maturity of a tradition and the subject who is at home in it commits the 
international sphere to a form of political liberalism, but one capable of avoiding the 
ambiguity of whether tolerance, respect and equality are substantive or formal values.  
Hampshire has something similar in mind when he states that:  
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The opposite of monotheism and of this monomoralism is the 
recognition of polymorphous ideals and of diverse conceptions of the 
good, tempered by respect for the local conventions and rules of conflict 
resolution.  It is reasonable to be a universalist in the cause of 
reasonableness in the regulations of conflicts (‘hear the other side’), but 
not a universalist in the defence of particular outcomes of particular 
conflicts of moral opinion.
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In the procedural sphere, one sees reason as dominate, in the sociological sphere one 
holds hermeneutics to be dominant.  One must respect difference, but simultaneously 
strive for intelligibility, and also be sincerely committed to the aim of the dialogue, 
that is resolution or accommodation.  Such an attitude characterises a mature tradition.  
So, reason has two roles: one, the universalist demand for “respecting” difference and 
others (a necessary presupposition if one wants to overcome conflict rather than 
repress it); and two, the interrogation of a form of life and its motivations in 
accordance with basic human needs, wants and desires.   Imagination augments this 
activity by revealing those standards of reasoning in play by both participants in the 
dialogue and reason formally demands that the dialogue be free and public and 
substantively demands that motivations be possible reasons for action for agents.  The 
tandem approach of imagination and reason can be subsumed into one activity, a 
methodological bottom-up reasoning with the sole project of interpreting the validity 
of cultural ways of life and the reasons they offer for action, motivating a movement 
towards an ethics of interpretation: universal norms which constrain the sphere of a 
dialogue, a hermeneutical commitment to greater cultural understanding and a 
different interpretation of the idea of overlapping consensus of political values from 
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the more commonly held liberal one.
36
  When one engages in dialogue, the maturity 
of the tradition commits one to grant equality to all participants and the true meaning 
of the values of political liberalism is the embodiment of this maturity without 
replacing the embeddedness of the tradition’s values.  There are political values which 
determine the formal nature of conflict (tolerance, respect, et cetera) which are pre-
conditions for the resolution of conflict without the recourse to violence (rationalism); 
there are substantive values that rule what constitutes possible motivations for all 
human beings (rational naturalism); and finally, there are comprehensive values 
belonging to agents due to their tradition and social fabric that ought to be heard and 
comprehended (imagination). 
More importantly, such an ethics of interpretation will shatter the tenuous relationship 
between an individual and his or her state.  International issues that cannot be handled 
through the representation of the person of the state will demand a different, 
cosmopolitan, approach.  What motivates my and the other’s reasoned prescriptions?  
If it is simple self-interest, then agreement will be impossible and compromise 
unstable since it relies on trust and there is no guarantor at the international level.  If it 
relies on national interest, then the issue is one where I am properly represented in 
state-to-state international relations.  If it relies on obligations from my way of life, 
are these and the presuppositions that ground them explicable and sanctionable by the 
other with whom I am in dialogue?  And ways of life here refers to one’s social roles, 
interests as part of a larger group separate from the nation and perhaps in 
contradiction of it (extending as far as a virtual world community in matters such as 
the environment).  These three examples do not exhaust the list of possible 
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motivations but they serve to illustrate one sphere of cosmopolitan action within 
current political structures. 
I stated earlier that for a cosmopolitics to be adequate to its task, it must be articulated 
in terms of values which are intelligible and recognised by each community whom the 
ruling affects.  The hope is that the through the reciprocal regulation of reason by 
imagination and imagination by reason, values will neither be forced on nor 
unintelligible to individuals. 
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